Economic Profitability of Regulated vs. Unregulated Industries by Powers, Glenn T.
ECONOMIC PROFITABILITY OF REGULATED VS.
UNREGULATED INDUSTRIES
by
Glenn T. Powers
B.A., Amherst College, 1984
a project submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Financial Risk Management
in the Faculty
of
Business Administration
c© Glenn T. Powers 2010
SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY
Summer 2010
All rights reserved. This work may not be
reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy
or other means, without the permission of the author.
APPROVAL
Name: Glenn T. Powers
Degree: Master of Financial Risk Management
Title of project: Economic Profitability of Regulated vs. Unregulated Indus-
tries
Examining Committee:
Dr. Aidan Vining, CNABS Professor of Business and
Government Relations
Faculty of Business Administration, Simon Fraser
University
Senior Supervisor
Dr. Andrey Pavlov, Associate Professor
Faculty of Business Administration, Simon Fraser
University
Co-Supervisor
Date Approved:
ii
Abstract
This thesis examines whether regulated industries in North America are more or less prof-
itable than unregulated industries. There is extensive literature on the theory of regulation
and the possibility that regulated companies “capture” regulators which come to serve their
interests, but much less literature on the consequences of regulation. Most empirical studies
tested this hypothesis by looking at specific regulatory events. This thesis looks across 150
different sub-industries, and finds that the economic profits of regulated industries are higher
than unregulated industries. This paper also finds that the annual variation in economic
profit is lower for regulated industries. Using an ANOVA test, the paper shows that the
differences in economic profits related to type of regulation are statistically significant.
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Chapter 1
Does Industry Regulation Lead to
Higher Profits?
“Our primary mission is to prevent legislation.”
Comment of Samuel D. Chilcote, Jr., President of the Tobacco Institute, in a speech on Jan-
uary 20, 1988. Despite increasing regulation, the tobacco industry was the most profitable
of the 150 industries analyzed in this paper.
1.1 Introduction
Prior to the 1970s, regulation was seen as a mechanism by which governments constrained
the activities of companies to in the public interest, a term that became popular during the
new deal era of American politics (McCraw 1975). Beginning with Stigler, (1971) a new
theoretical perspective started to examine regulation from the perspective of supply and
demand for regulation, and proposed the idea that organized interest groups – most notably
the industries that are being regulated – are able to capture regulators and manipulate them
to serve their interests. Peltzman (1976) formalized this idea as the Economic Theory of
Regulation. Peltzman developed a framework which predicted that regulated entities are
usually, but not always, the beneficiaries of government regulation.
The economic theory of regulation would provide the intellectual force behind a broad
deregulatory movement in the United States and other countries in the 1980s (Peltzman
1989), and become a major theme of market economists like Milton Friedman. These ideas
would come to be known as the Chicago School of economics and would profoundly influence
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public policy. By one estimate, the percent of U.S. GNP produced by fully regulated indus-
tries fell from 17% to 6.6% between 1977 and 1998, as large parts of the communications,
energy and financial industries were significantly deregulated (Winston 1993).
The debate between public interest theory and capture theory continues. While many
authors have argued about the motivations and the mechanisms of regulation, the literature
on the consequences of regulation is more limited.
This paper tests the hypothesis that regulated industries generate greater economic
profit, i.e. profit in excess of their cost of capital, than unregulated industries. The paper
finds that industries that face greater regulation generally have profits that exceed their
cost of capital, while less regulated companies do not. Other studies have found that public
companies in the U.S. have lower profits than their cost of capital (Hawawini 2002). This
paper is, to our knowledge, the first to find that the opposite is true of regulated companies.
This paper also finds that regulated companies had less annual variability in their economic
profits.
The paper is organized into three sections. First, the paper briefly examines the history
of regulatory theory and the previous literature measuring the affects of regulation. Second,
it looks at the extent of regulation in different industries and develops a framework for
categorizing industries by type of regulation. Third, it uses a database of financial data
in North American companies from 2000-2009, and aggregates that data according to our
estimate of the extent to which the companies are part of highly regulated industries.
1.2 Measuring the Effects of Regulation on Profitability
The economic theory of regulation does not in itself require that regulation creates economic
rents. Stigler (1971) suggested that a surplus enabled by regulators could be consumed by
competition between rent-seekers for regulatory benefits. Peltzman (1976) viewed regulation
as lowering the cost of capital for regulated firms, and provided empirical evidence for that
view.
Several authors have looked at whether surpluses from regulation flowed to employees
of regulated firms. Edwards (1977) finds that bank regulation leads to expense preference
behaviour that benefits employees. Black (2001) looked at banks that were in the process of
deregulation, and finds that bank regulation benefited employees, and even more specifically,
benefited male employees more than female employees. Rose (1987) found, by studying the
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trucking industry during deregulation, that labor had been a significant beneficiary of the
previous regulatory regime.
Numerous studies look at the direct costs of compliance with regulation. Most of these
papers examine the costs of complying with environmental cost. Hopkins (1992) explores
the compliance costs associated with regulation generally, while others (Jaffe, 1995) explore
compliance costs in manufacturing and finds that they added $1 trillion in costs over ten
years, reducing American competitiveness in manufacturing. Heyes (2000) and Porter (1995)
looked specifically at the cost of compliance with environment regulation. Weidenbaum
(2000) puts the annual cost of compliance with regulation in the United States at $400-700
billion.
1.3 Measuring the Effects of Regulation On Stock Volatility
and Returns
Binder (1985) measured the immediate change in stock prices following regulation events.
Binder tracked 20 regulatory events all the way back to the Interstate Commerce Act of
1887. The research failed to find that regulatory changes caused a significant change in
equity values, noting that one challenge lay in knowing when markets started to anticipate
regulatory change, and also that regulatory change typically happened over different periods
in different jurisdictions.
Many studies have looked at the effect of regulatory changes by examination of asset
and equity betas. Peltzman (1976) noted a decline in the beta of drug and railroad stocks
after those industries were regulated. Fraser (1990) argues that the long-term nature of
beta provide a better measure of regulatory changes than the more immediate stock price
change. Fraser further finds statistically greater predictability of earnings (as measured by
comparing analyst forecasts to actual results) in regulated companies.
Mitchell and Mulherin (1988) found that tobacco stocks had abnormal positive returns
following the regulatory imposition of an advertising ban in 1970, and notes the beta of
tobacco stocks declined significantly (from 0.69 to 0.54) from the years before the increase in
regulation and the years afterward. Hogan, Sharpe, and Volker (1980) find that shareholder
risk is negatively correlated with the intensity of regulation in Australian banks.
The literature does not universally conclude that regulation makes stocks less risky
or leads to higher returns. For example, Lenway, Rehbein and Starks find (1990) find that
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increases in regulation in the steel industry are not associated with decreased systematic risk.
Allen and Wilhem (1988) looked at a 1980 regulation that increased reserve requirements
for non-federal banks. They found that that stock returns were affected by changes in
regulation of banks, but that the effect varied according to the type of financial institution.
1.4 Comparing the Profitability of Regulated and Unregu-
lated Industries
The bulk of the empirical studies on the effects of regulation are event studies within specific
industries. These studies suggest that regulation sometimes leads to higher profits and a
lower cost of capital. The literature also looks at regulation from the perspective of the cost
of compliance. From an economic perspective, this is like looking at the cost of tax policy
based on the time required to fill out a tax form.
This paper takes a different approach, looking across industries to test the hypothesis
that regulation is associated with higher levels of economic profit. Section 2 of this paper
will show that certain industries that are more regulated than others, and establish three
disctinct categories of government regulation. Section 3 of the paper will divide a database
of public companies by regulation type and establish that there is a significant difference
in the profitability of regulated and unregulated companies. The paper will also examine
the variability of profits across economic cycles and find that regulated industries have
less annual variation. Finally, the paper will show that these differences are statistically
significant.
Chapter 2
What is a Regulated Industry?
2.1 The Extent of Regulation in Different Industries
It is impossible to characterize any industry as either completely regulated or completely
deregulated. Winston (1993) describes regulatory policy as encompassing an industry’s
economic conduct, from pricing to entry and exist, its social conduct, and its externalities.
This paper looks exclusively at publicly traded companies in North America; each of these
companies has opted in to substantial regulation by virtue of choosing to sell shares to the
public. Every company in the database must conform to trade, labor, and environmental
regulations.
This paper will argue that despite significant deregulation during the past twenty years,
that it is possible to characterize certain industries as being subject to a greater regula-
tory burden than others. In general, the following criteria were used to establish whether
industries are substantially regulated:
• Does the academic literature discuss regulation specific to that industry?
• Is there a specific federal agency that is devoted to regulating an industry?
• Does regulation in an industry fundamentally limit the markets a company can address
and the manner in which it address those markets?
The literature does not provide an analysis of the extent to which different industries are
regulated, or even of the mechanisms by which regulation is accomplished. Breyer (1982)
analyzes six different types of regulation, but all are mechanisms for addressing natural
monopolies.
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This paper takes a relatively broad view of regulated industries. For example, we view
the tobacco industry, with extensive excise taxes that are specific to its primary product,
and regulation of marketing practices and packaging, as highly regulated. Gruber (2001)
provides an extensive review of tobacco regulation in the United States. Using many of same
criteria, we consider alcoholic beverages to be highly regulated. McGowan (1997) provides
a review of alcohol industry regulation. Casino gambling, despite a significant decrease in
prohibition in the last two decades, is among the most regulated industries in the United
States (Sauer 2001).
We consider the pharmaceutical industry to be highly regulated. With the exception of
the United States, most countries control not only whether a drug can be marketed, but
the price at which it can be sold (Vernon 2005). While the United States does not generally
regulate price, the activities of the industry are closely intertwined with the federal agency
(the Food and Drug Administration) that regulates it.
Electric, gas and other utilities continue to be heavily regulated in the United States. A
huge portion of the literature on regulation addresses these industries.
Telecommunications represents a more difficult situation however. Winston (1993) ar-
gues that cable television and telecommunications have been substantially reformed but
that radio and television broadcasting remain heavily regulated. Noam (2006) argues that
telecommunications providers are not heavily regulated, and argues the deregulation has
significantly increased the variability of earnings in that industry.
We include insurance and deposit taking institutions as regulated companies. While
insurance is generally regulated (albeit at times dysfunctionally) at the state level in the
United States, it is among the most heavily regulated U.S. industries (Jost and Hall, 2005).
There is an extensive literature on regulation of banking in the U.S. and internationally.
Allen and Herring (2001) suggest that bank regulation is widespread in attempt to avoid
systemic financial risk and protect depositors and investors, but also to achieve goals like
fighting organized crime and money laundering and facilitating home ownership.
The following table shows the list of regulated industries as it is implemented in our
database, and the industry description as provided by S&P and MSCI.
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Industry
Rate of 
Return
Capital 
Require- 
ments
Specific 
Agency Industry Description
Casinos & Gaming 0 0 1
Owners and operators of casinos and gaming facilities. Includes 
companies providing lottery and betting services.
Brewers 0 0 1
Producers of beer and malt liquors. Includes breweries not classified 
in the Restaurants sub-industry.
Distillers & Vintners 0 0 1
Distillers, vintners and producers of alcoholic beverages not 
classified in the Brewers sub-industry.
Tobacco 0 0 1 Manufacturers of cigarettes and other tobacco products.
Biotechnology 0 0 1
Companies primarily engaged in the research, development, 
manufacturing and/or marketing of products based on genetic 
analysis and genetic engineering.  Includes companies specializing in 
protein-based therapeutics to treat human diseases
Pharmaceuticals 0 0 1
Companies engaged in the research, development or production of 
pharmaceuticals. Includes veterinary drugs.
Diversified Banks 0 1 0
Commercial banks whose businesses are derived primarily from 
commercial lending operations and have significant business activity 
in retail banking and small and medium corporate lending.  Excludes 
banks classified in the Regional Banks and Thrifts & Mortgage 
Finance sub-industries. Also excludes investment banks classified in 
the Investment Banking & Brokerage sub-industry.
Regional Banks 0 1 0
Commercial banks whose businesses are derived primarily from 
commercial lending operations and have significant business activity 
in retail banking and small and medium corporate lending. Regional 
banks tend to operate in limited geographic regions. Excludes 
companies classified in the Diversified Banks and Thrifts & Mortgage 
Banks sub-industries. Also excludes investment banks classified in 
the Investment Banking & Brokerage sub-industry.
Thrifts & Mortgage Finance 0 1 0
Financial institutions providing mortgage and mortgage related 
services.  These include financial institutions whose assets are 
primarily mortgage related, savings & loans, mortgage GSE’s 
(government sponsored enterprises), mortgage lending institutions, 
building societies and companies providing insurance to mortgage 
banks.
Life & Health Insurance 0 1 0
Companies providing primarily life, disability, indemnity or 
supplemental health insurance. Excludes managed care companies 
classified in the Managed Health Care sub-industry.
Multi-line Insurance 0 1 0
Insurance companies with diversified interests in life, health and 
property and casualty insurance.
Property & Casualty Insurance 0 1 0 Companies providing primarily property and casualty insurance.
Electric Utilities 1 0 0
Companies that produce or distribute electricity. Includes both 
nuclear and non-nuclear facilities.
Gas Utilities 1 0 0
Companies whose main charter is to distribute and transmit natural 
and manufactured gas. Excludes companies primarily involved in gas 
exploration or production classified in the Oil & Gas Exploration & 
Production sub-industry.  Also excludes diversified midstream 
natural gas companies classified in the Oil & Gas Refining, Marketing 
& Transportation sub-industry.
Multi-Utilities 1 0 0
Utility companies with significantly diversified activities in addition to 
core Electric Utility, Gas Utility and/or Water Utility operations.
Water Utilities 1 0 0
Companies that purchase and redistribute water to the end-
consumer. Includes large-scale water treatment systems.
Type of Regulation
Figure 2.1: List of Regulated Industries in Financial Database
Chapter 3
Empirical Results
Our empirical analysis seeks to answer the following question: During the past ten years,
have companies in more heavily regulated industries generated greater economic profits than
companies in less regulated industries?
The 10,500 companies we examined, in aggregate, failed to generate an economic profit
from 1999-2009. Over 10 years, these companies generated operating profit after tax of $10.7
trillion. This is not the same, however, as economic profit. In aggregate, the companies
in the database had lower profits than their cost of capital. This finding is consistent
with Hawawini (2002) which looked at economic profit as measured by Stern Stewart and
Companies across all industries and found a similar magnitude of shortfall in economic
profit.
Did regulated industries fare better? Based on the most recent decade, they did: highly
regulated industries generated economic profits, while relatively unregulated industries did
not. The amount of economic profit, however, varied according to the type of regulation
the companies face.
Companies that face traditional rate of return regulation, such as utilities, had economic
profits that were positive but very close to zero. These companies had a very low cost of
capital relative to other companies in the database, and had earnings about equal to their
cost of capital. In aggregate, they were economically profitable, and fared better than
unregulated companies.
Companies which faced regulation of capital requirements, like banks and insurance
companies, had negative economic profits during the 10-year period. This result, however,
is heavily influenced by losses in mortgage providers (especially U.S. Thrifts) in 2008 and
8
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2009. Without these losses, companies that lend money (national banks, regional banks
and thrifts) generated economic profit. Insurance companies, however, generated economic
losses over the period. Overall, this category of regulated industry generated economic
losses, even without the unusual banking losses in 2008 and 2009.
Finally, companies that face specific restrictions on the products they sell and they way
they distribute and market their products were highly profitable economically. Brewers,
vintners, distillers, tobacco companies, and pharmaceutical companies all generated signifi-
cant economic profits.
3.1 Sources of Financial and Market Data
Most of the data used for this analysis was retrieved from the Compustat database of
Standard and Poors. Data was collected for all North American companies that file financial
data with the SEC. The only filter on the data was that companies have revenues of greater
than $1 million. There are approximately 11,800 companies in the filtered database, and
75,000 individual records, representing one year of data for each company.
The following data items, and the code with which we will refer to them, were used in
our analysis:
From company income statements, as recorded in the Compustat database:
• Pretax Income (PI)
• Net Income (NI)
• Interest Expense (XINT)
From company balance sheets, as recorded in the Compustat database:
• Total Assets (AT)
• Shareholders Equity (SEQ)
• Total Liabilities (LT)
• Long-term Debt (DLTT)
From Standard and Poors/Morgan Stanley, again from the Compustat database: GICS
Sub-Industry (GSUBIND)
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From Bloomberg L.P.: Beta (BETA)
GICS (Global Industry Classification System) codes were developed by a joint venture of
Morgan Stanley and Standard and Poors. The GICS system assigns ever public companies
to one of 123 sub-industries that best represent, in the view of their analysts, the industry
sector that best fits their mix of businesses. The GICS codes use a hierarchy. For example
Industry code 1010 is Energy; Code 101010 is energy equipment and services; and code
10101010 is Oil and Gas Drilling.
3.2 Survivor Bias
The primary database, CompuStat, was chosen partially because it includes companies that
are no longer publicly traded but were publicly traded in the past. Approximately 26% of the
observations in the database used for this study are from companies that are not currently
publicly held. The reasons they are no longer public include mergers, going private, and
bankruptcy. In general, the companies that are no longer public are smaller than average;
they represent 12% of the capital deployed during the study.
At the level of specific sub-industries, however, including these “deleted” companies can
make a large difference in the aggregate profitability of an industry. The inclusion of now-
bankrupt companies like Abitibi Bowater in paper products or General Motors in automobile
manufacturing significantly changes the aggregate profitability of these industries. Both, in
fact, were the largest companies within their industries in terms of capital deployed.
3.3 Calculating Economic Profits
For each record (one company, one year), the economic profit was calculated. The framework
is similar to the idea of Economic Value Added as developed by Stern Stewart and Co.,
but differs from that firm’s proprietary EVA database by avoid numerous adjustments to
accounting data that require analysis of each company. Many of these adjustments are to
compensate for timing differences between economic and accounting profits (Savarese 2000)
and may become less important in our database, which is ultimately aggregated over 10
years. For this article, economic profit (EP) was defined as net operating profit after tax
minus the cost of capital for that year, coded in our system as:
EP = NOPAT − (C ∗ CCR) (3.1)
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We defined the tax rate, T as
T = (PI −NI)/PI (3.2)
where PI is pre-tax income and NI is net income.
Net Operating Profit after Taxes (NOPAT) was defined as
NOPAT = NI + XINT ∗ (1− T ) (3.3)
where NI is net income, XINT is interest expense, and T is the tax rate (see equation 3.3).
Capital, C, was defined as
C = SEQ + DLTT (3.4)
where SEQ is shareholders’ equity and DLTT is long-term debt.
The CCR provided the greatest challenge. First, the companies was capital was divided
into debt and equity companies, based on book accounting values.
The debt portion of capital, DC, was defined as
DC = DLTT/(SEQ + DLTT ) (3.5)
where DLTT is long-term debt and SEQ is shareholders’ equity.
The equity portion of capital, EC was defined as
EC =
SEQ/(SEQ + DLTT ) if SEQ > 0,100% if SEQ ≤ 0. (3.6)
The cost of debt, KD was defined as
KD = max(0, XINT/DLTT ) (3.7)
where XINT is interest expense and DLTT is long-term debt.
CHAPTER 3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 12
The risk-free rate, RF was defined as the average, for the previous 12 months, of the
3-month US treasury bill annualized yield, as reported by the St. Louis Federal Reserve
bank.
The cost of equity, KE, was defined as
KE = RF + BETA ∗ 0.05 (3.8)
with 0.05 being a somewhat arbitrary choice of market risk premium based on long-term
risk premia observed in North American equity markets.
Beta was based on an OLS regression of weekly returns to either the S&P 500 index (for
U.S. companies) or TSX Index (for Canadian companies) during the past two years. Where
a consistent data set precluded calculation of beta, the average beta of companies in that
sub-industry was used.
The cost of capital ratio, or CCR was defined as
CCR = (KD ∗DLTT ) + (KE ∗ SEQ) (3.9)
where KD is the cost of debt, DLTT the long-term debit, KE the cost of equity, and SEQ
is shareholders’ equity.
3.4 Accounting Profitability by Type of Regulation
For each subindustry i, data were aggregated for each year n and company j. For example,
revenues were for a subindustry would be calculated as
2009∑
n=2000
j∑
j=1
(AnnualRevenue).
We view economic profit as more relevant than accounting profit for the purposes of
establishing whether regulation has a positive economic effect on regulated on companies in
regulated industry. However, it is instructive to look at the profitability of each industry in
the database over a long time period from the perspective of duPont analysis.
ROE =
NetIncome
Revenues
∗ Revenues
Assets
∗ Assets
Equity
(3.10)
The figure below shows the profitability of each industry following the DuPont analysis
construct. Industries which are not highly regulated have been further aggregated from the
eight digit GSUBIND to the two-digit industry level.
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The aggregate ROE of all companies studied was about 9%. Regulated utilities had a
slightly higher ROE, even though they deployed less leverage. Companies with regulated
capital requirements had the lowest ROE, despite using the greatest degree of leverage.
Low profitability of insurance companies and mortgage companies were the main drivers: if
these two subindustries were removed, the ROE of this regulatory group would actually be
slightly higher than the aggregate for all industries.
The highest ROE regulatory group is the specific agency companies, with pharmaceu-
ticals, alcohol and tobacco contributing to the high profitability levels. In aggregate, com-
panies regulated by a specific government agency had a ROE double that of less regulated
industries.
3.5 Economic Profitability is Higher for Companies Facing
Greater Regulation
In aggregate, the companies in our database had economic profits less than their cost of
capital. This was not, the case, however, for most of the more regulated industries. Reg-
ulated utilities had economic profits slightly larger than their cost of capital. Financial
companies regulated according the capital requirements had less economic profits relative
to capital deployed than other companies. The difference, however, came from two specific
sub-industries: multi-line insurance and thrifts / mortgage finance. Without these two in-
dustries, the RI Ratio of the regulated financials changes from -2% to 6%, far greater than
less regulated companies.
The financial turmoil of 2008 and 2009 was significant for this group of companies.
Eliminating these two years changes the aggregate RI ratio of regulated financial compa-
nies from -2% to 0%. Multi-line insurance companies had an aggregate RI Ratio of -2.1%
without 2008-2009, vs. -7% for all ten years. Thrifts and mortgage finance companies had
an aggregate RI ratio of -1.2% for the eight years vs. -4.3% for all ten years.
Companies that were regulated by specific agencies had profits greatly in excess of their
cost of capital. The tobacco and pharmaceutical industries were the two most profitable
in the database, although there were a few less regulated industries that were nearly as
profitable as pharmaceuticals, including software drinks (10.2%), IT/Consulting (10.4%)
and household products (10.2%). No other sub-industry in our database approaches the
excess returns of the tobacco industry.
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NI / Revenues
Revenues / 
Assets
Assets / 
Shareholders' 
Equity
ROE
Normal Regulatory Burden 4.1% 46.2% 460.5% 8.6%
Consumer Discretionary 1.0% 81.6% 330.1% 2.8%Advertising 0 3 59 0 402 0 0ppa el Retail 3 8 1 8 197 3 14 2, Accessories & Luxury Goods 4 5 27 3 22 3uto Pa ts & Equipment 9 3 4 5 8 3obile Manufacturers -2 9 381 -4tiv Reta l 7 21 5 9Broadc sting & Cable TV 2 3 1 4 2 - 0Ca log t il . 5. . .omputer  El ctronics Retail 4 7 8 9nsum El c ronics 4 5De ment Stores 6 8 6 6 6istribu ors 5 1 5E ucatio Services 8 3 8F tw ar 7 1 0 7 7G ral M rchandis  Sto es 66 46 5 1H e Fu ishings . . 3 .1 .7I prov m t Re ail 5 7 4 8b ild ng 1 102 72 2f rni hing Retail 4 8 1 0 12els, R s rts & Cru se Lines 3 4 58 29h l  Applia c s 0 29 41s wares & Sp i ties 8% % 1 8% 9 %Internet R tail -2 3 20 -Leisu Facilities 0.9 .2 3 . .P oduct 8 9Motorcycl  anufactur rs 1 93 6 5 2vi s & E ert in ent 2 41 0 0 2 4 4Photogr hic Pro u 5 3ubl s ing 5 4 8 9R aura ts 6 17 53 8Sp c alize  Co mer S rvices 6 1 8t  St r s . 6 . 6 . .6T x iles -5 4 9 35 - 0 1ir s & ubber 6 1 5 7 4 -5 3
Consumer Staples 4.0% 161.7% 273.1% 17.6%Agricultural Products 2 4 8 1 37 0 5Drug R tail 209 2 04 0 2Food Distribut rs 1 9 3 2 9 3 5 4 2 7l 5 47 3 1 1H sehold Products 1 3 0 0 4yperma kets & Super Centers 3 1 53 4 9 8 8Packaged Foods & M ats 6 1 5 91 5 5 0e sonal Pr ducts 5. 2 . 5 .7 4 .S ft Dr nks 0 6 6
Energy 7.6% 87.5% 235.6% 15.6%Coal & Consumable Fuels 4 9 58 7 96 1 8 5Integrated Oil & Gas 8 3 122 4 07 8 21 1Oil & Gas Dril ing 11 7 49 3 170 2 9 8Eq ipment & Services 6 5 5 3 4 3xp oration  Production 33 2 2 7 2Refining & Marketing 2 0 9 3 9Storage Transporta 2 60 35 3 0
Financials 8.9% 9.4% 1110.2% 9.3%Asset Management & Custody Banks 13 6 11 659 8 10Co sumer Finance 0 2 3 081 0 7Div rsifi d Capital Markets -1 7 245 6 -1 8REIT's 9 4 6 307 8Industrial REIT's 5 5 0 8 5 6 0s anc  Brokers 7 50 6 3 9t Banki g  Brokerage 6 7 5 2 1 2Mortgage I 's 2. 6.1 726. .ulti-Secto  Holdings 8 8 5 4Offi e REIT's 3 3th r Diver ifi d Fin ncial Services 0 4 7Real Est t  I v tment Trusts -- Di continued effective 04/28/2 0 4M gement & Dev lopment 4 -- Discon inued effective 04/28/2006 4in ur nce 1 5side tial I 's 2 .9 . 10. 9.tail I ' 1 7 1 9Spec liz F nance 8 2 6 3 4 E T 3 2 2 5 6
Health Care 3.5% 122.0% 273.1% 11.5%Health Care Distributors 1 1 369 5 9 4 2 3Equipment 9 7 9 185 7Facilities 2 98 510 2 0 7Serv ces 8 7 31 0 6uppli 5 4 6 2 4 9 6T hnology 4 9 8 8 2 9Life Scienc s Tools & Services 7 3 2Manag d Health Care . 4.1 3 . 4.
Industrial 4.6% 70.9% 396.4% 12.8%
Information Technology 0.8% 80.7% 196.9% 1.3%
Materials 3.4% 78.8% 283.3% 7.5%
Utilities 1.8% 43.8% 542.4% 4.2%Independent Power Producers & Energy Traders
Telecommunications Services 4.6% 43.9% 291.1% 5.9%Alternative C rrier -38 36 0 430 9 -59In gr ed Telec mmunication Services 6 8 4 6 315 8 6Wireless Tel com unication Services 1 7 2 8 5 1
Rate of Return 6.3% 42.6% 367.7% 9.9%
Utilities 6.3% 42.6% 367.7% 9.9%
Electric Utilities 7.1% 38.9% 359.3% 9.9%
Gas Utilities 5.3% 65.1% 341.1% 11.8%
Multi-Utilities 5.3% 45.1% 398.9% 9.5%
Water Utilities 0.5% 22.1% 325.8% 0.4%
Reg Capital Requirement 6.6% 9.5% 1186.7% 7.4%
Financials 6.6% 9.5% 1186.7% 7.4%
Diversified Banks 13.2% 6.9% 1461.3% 13.3%
Life & Health Insurance 6.0% 11.0% 1424.2% 9.4%
Multi-line Insurance 0.1% 12.1% 1007.5% 0.1%
Property & Casualty Insurance 8.1% 30.1% 372.7% 9.1%
Regional Banks 11.2% 7.0% 1071.5% 8.4%
Thrifts & Mortgage Finance -4.8% 5.9% 2027.6% -5.8%
Specific Agency 13.7% 57.7% 231.8% 18.3%
Consumer Discretionary 2.8% 46.4% 434.9% 5.6%
Casinos & Gaming 2.8% 46.4% 434.9% 5.6%
Consumer Staples 14.4% 69.5% 318.6% 32.0%
Brewers 10.6% 70.8% 268.6% 20.2%
Distillers & Vintners 6.3% 65.3% 244.6% 10.0%
Tobacco 16.1% 69.6% 344.7% 38.7%
Health Care 14.9% 55.7% 198.1% 16.5%
Biotechnology 3.4% 38.2% 159.5% 2.1%
Pharmaceuticals 16.6% 59.8% 209.7% 20.9%
Grand Total 4.8% 33.3% 566.4% 9.0%
Figure 3.1: DuPont Analysis by Industry and Regulation Type
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Operating Profit 
After Tax
Capital 
Deployed
Capital 
Charge
Residual 
Income
Industry RI 
Ratio
Std Dev of 
RIRatio
Normal Regulatory Burden 7,645,958                101,383,726     9.9% (1,549,590)    -1.5% 95%
Consumer Discretionary 605,172                   14,993,547        11.1% (823,640)       -5.5% 95%
Consumer Staples 651,577                   5,148,210          9.4% 287,231         5.6% 32%
Energy 1,205,433                9,853,777          9.6% 410,944         4.2% 52%
Financials 2,862,272                33,876,322        9.8% (632,535)       -1.9% 149%
Health Care 294,909                   3,299,844          8.8% 40,009           1.2% 60%
Industrial 1,049,300                11,862,614        10.1% 64,916           0.5% 62%
Information Technology 193,011                   8,425,093          8.9% (467,221)       -5.5% 123%
Materials 360,888                   5,656,071          10.4% (147,507)       -2.6% 49%
Utilities 39,426                     1,881,170          9.4% (136,552)       -7.3% 61%
Telecommunications Services 383,970                   6,387,078          11.0% (145,234)       -2.3% 125%
Rate of Return 757,501                   10,375,839        7.3% 21,404           0.2% 29%
Utilities 757,501                   10,375,839        7.3% 21,404           0.2% 29%
Electric Utilities 491,156                   6,594,941          7.2% 26,935           0.4% 37%
Gas Utilities 67,487                     811,498             7.7% 6,608             0.8% 6%
Multi-Utilities 195,616                   2,868,966          7.4% (8,523)            -0.3% 15%
Water Utilities 3,242                        100,434             7.1% (3,617)            -3.6% 7%
Reg Capital Requirement 1,655,568                29,180,808        5.5% (592,693)       -2.0% 43%
Financials 1,655,568                29,180,808        5.5% (592,693)       -2.0% 43%
Diversified Banks 435,548                   5,558,062          7.2% 102,261         1.8% 7%
Life & Health Insurance 229,560                   2,719,602          9.7% (41,181)          -1.5% 20%
Multi-line Insurance 63,721                     2,258,489          8.4% (160,814)        -7.1% 13%
Property & Casualty Insurance 234,518                   2,852,557          7.8% 20,772           0.7% 132%
Regional Banks 177,356                   4,267,091          5.1% (23,776)          -0.6% 12%
Thrifts & Mortgage Finance 514,865                   11,525,007        4.4% (489,955)        -4.3% 23%
Specific Agency 633,496                   4,627,371          9.5% 310,702         6.7% 61%
Consumer Discretionary 31,244                     651,530             11.7% (30,474)          -4.7% 31%
Casinos & Gaming 31,244                     651,530             11.7% (30,474)          -4.7% 31%
Consumer Staples 174,594                   862,806             8.7% 114,468         13.3% 29%
Brewers 25,566                     197,361             7.0% 13,153           6.7% 14%
Distillers & Vintners 6,267                        80,434               8.6% (26)                 0.0% 19%
Tobacco 142,762                   585,011             10.4% 101,342         17.3% 43%
Health Care 427,659                   3,113,035          9.1% 226,708         7.3% 69%
Biotechnology 17,155                     715,610             9.4% (28,993)          -4.1% 81%
Pharmaceuticals 410,503                   2,397,425          8.7% 255,702         10.7% 46%
Grand Total 10,692,524              145,567,743     9.1% (1,810,178)    -1.2% 86%
Figure 3.2: Economic Profitability by Industry and Regulation Type
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3.6 Variation of Profitability is Lower for Regulated Compa-
nies
The data for this thesis spans ten years, which includes two recessions (March to November
of 2001, December 2007 to 2009). Economic profits were generally positive during periods
of economic growth and negative around periods of recession.
Regulated industries showed less variability than less regulated industries. The figure
below shows the RI Ratio by year, and the standard deviation of the RI ratio across the
ten-year period. The unregulated sample had a standard deviation of 3.8%, while the rate-of-
return and specific agency samples had a standard deviation of 1.3%. The standard deviation
of the regulated financial companies was actually higher than unregulated companies, but
this was influenced by the extremely losses in 2008. Without the data from 2008, the
financial companies would have had a lower annual variability of economic profits than the
unregulated group.
3.7 Sum of Excess Profits vs. Average of Residual Income
Observations
Their is a large difference between the summation of economic profits of each industry — the
sum of the residual income divided by the sum of capital deployed — and the average of our
observations. Within each industry, economic profitability is heterogeneous. In many cases,
only a small number of firms generate economic profits while the vast majority generate
profits lower than their cost of capital.
While this difference is evident in every type of regulation, the difference is most pro-
nounced in companies that we categorize as facing regulation by specific agencies. In this
group, most of the companies did not cover their cost of capital. A small number of highly
profitable companies, however, overwhelmed the many companies with negative returns. Un-
like rate-of-return regulation, where approximately neutral economic profits are the norm,
this type of regulation is associated with a large number of “losers” and a small number of
winners.
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Residual Income Capital Deployed Industry RI Ratio
Std Dev of 
Annual Sum
Normal Regulatory Burden (1,549,590)                101,383,726            -1.5% 3.8%
2000 (288,856)                   7,914,082                 -3.6%
2001 (759,615)                   8,307,647                 -9.1%
2002 (632,958)                   8,259,226                 -7.7%
2003 66,842                       9,072,242                 0.7%
2004 98,522                       10,080,952               1.0%
2005 140,133                    10,359,103               1.4%
2006 146,250                    11,341,127               1.3%
2007 (106,510)                   12,491,764               -0.9%
2008 (266,224)                   11,909,723               -2.2%
2009 52,827                       11,647,862               0.5%
Rate of Return 21,404                       10,375,839               0.2% 1.3%
2000 (23,194)                     849,616                    -2.7%
2001 4,072                         938,952                    0.4%
2002 (14,878)                     957,623                    -1.6%
2003 4,091                         1,000,094                 0.4%
2004 17,358                       1,016,279                 1.7%
2005 3,985                         1,030,011                 0.4%
2006 7,118                         1,073,468                 0.7%
2007 (28)                             1,117,858                 0.0%
2008 5,129                         1,175,434                 0.4%
2009 17,751                       1,216,504                 1.5%
Reg Capital Requirement (592,693)                   29,180,808               -2.0% 4.7%
2000 (33,202)                     2,159,281                 -1.5%
2001 (29,199)                     2,429,190                 -1.2%
2002 12,799                       2,664,099                 0.5%
2003 38,697                       2,979,291                 1.3%
2004 39,439                       3,127,855                 1.3%
2005 13,598                       3,043,643                 0.4%
2006 9,625                         3,300,694                 0.3%
2007 (34,920)                     3,449,739                 -1.0%
2008 (401,567)                   2,973,908                 -13.5%
2009 (207,964)                   3,053,107                 -6.8%
Specific Agency 310,702                    4,627,371                 6.7% 1.3%
2000 18,369                       292,591                    6.3%
2001 25,544                       336,619                    7.6%
2002 27,115                       360,047                    7.5%
2003 20,528                       431,146                    4.8%
2004 31,808                       460,747                    6.9%
2005 28,279                       499,032                    5.7%
2006 36,996                       546,353                    6.8%
2007 28,360                       567,704                    5.0%
2008 37,842                       526,389                    7.2%
2009 55,860                       606,744                    9.2%
Grand Total (1,810,178)                145,567,743            -1.2% 3.7%
Figure 3.3: Annual Variation of Economic Profitability by Regulation Type
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Residual Income
Industry RI 
Ratio
StdDev of 
RIRatio
Avg of 
Observations
Normal Regulatory Burden (1,641,199)                      -1.5% 92% -10.2%
Consumer Discretionary (859,781)                         -5.3% 91% -8.9%Advertising (16 627   7 1 73 -1 5ppa el Retail 3 246 4 5 2 6, Accessories & Luxury ( 9    0 4 5uto Pa ts & Equipment 40 5 9 187 4 3obile Manufacturers 1 4 8 6 6 3 4 4 4tiv Reta l ( 5 1 7 9 0 1Broadc sting & Cable TV 3 4 56                         9 5 6 9Ca log t il ,8   8. 3 .omputer  El ctronics Retail 04 3 1 1 2nsum El c ronics 1 ) - 60 3 7De ment Stores (2 9 5 - 0istribu ors 37    4 -E ucatio Services 5 0 3 8F tw ar 7 3                         22G ral M rchandis  Sto es    2H e Fu ishings ( ,7 5. 8 .I prov m t Re ail 3 7 3b ild ng 8 4 9f rni hing Retail   0 41 2els, R s rts & Cru se Lines 16 0) - 9 5h l  Applia c s 2 5                         2 8s wares & Sp i ties 5   6% 9% -6 %Internet R tail ( 4 5 -1 1 86 - 9 4Leisu Facilities 8,916 .7 .P oduct 3 4 3 7Motorcycl  anufactur rs 4  9 14 11 2vi s & E ert in ent (2 9 8 6Photogr hic Pro u (8 8                           1 5ubl s ing 203   5 5R aura ts 2 1 2 3 4Sp c alize  Co mer S rvices ( 66 ) - 2 0 0t  St r s 7,72 6. 8 - .T x iles  7 2 39 -ir s & ubber ( 5 7 - 3 2 1
Consumer Staples 300,853                           5.5% 31% -2.3%Agricultural Products 2 680    1 2 23 2Drug R tail 15 0 4 0 8 4 6Food Distribut rs 275 6 1 16 1l 4 0 3 7 3H sehold Products 79 7 1 9 8yperma kets & Super Centers 6 067 7 7 1Packaged Foods & M ats 5 4                           3 2 5e sonal Pr ducts ,5 6    .4 5.4S ft Dr nks 1 3
Energy 405,458                           3.9% 61% -0.3%Coal & Consumable Fuels (767)      -0 4 76 3 7Integrated Oil & Gas 370 1 6 1 0 10 7 0Oil & Gas Dril ing (2 089 28 6Eq ipment & Services 31 4 6xp oration  Production 38 1 1 3 2 1Refining & Marketing 4 8 0 1 2Storage Transporta 2                           2 5 1
Financials (666,075)                         -1.9% 142% -2.6%Asset Management & Custody Banks 1 9 3      0 2 51 0 5Co sumer Finance 10 8 9 1 39 1 7Div rsifi d Capital Markets (10  -1 8 6 3 8REIT's 3 92 7Industrial REIT's ( 5 7 5 1s anc  Brokers 9 46 4 25 9t Banki g  Brokerage 398                         5 4 -24 3Mortgage I 's (24, 5   3.0 8 .ulti-Secto  Holdings 8         4Offi e REIT's 7 4 ) - -th r Diver ifi d Fin ncial Services ( 3 30 3Real Est t  I v tment Trusts -- Di continued effective 04/ 8/2006784 2 1M gement & Dev lopment 5 2 -- Discon inued effective 04/28/2 06( 1                          0in ur nce 2 2   4side tial I 's ,6 . 2 .tail I ' ( 0 6 4 0 6Spec liz F nance (1 3 3 1 2 7 9 5 E T 1 61 2
Health Care 37,668                             1.1% 58% -10.2%Health Care Distributors 8 432  3 2 4 1 8Equipment 23 783 2 8 37 2Facilities ( 4 097) -4 4 -7 6Serv ces 5 71 9 8 4uppli (1 8 5 7 1 9T hnology 3 0   0 7 6Life Scienc s Tools & Services 6 2                             3 1Manag d Health Care , 1 . 2 4.
Industrial 68,360                             0.5% 61% -6.5%Aerospace & Defense 46 911 2 8 40 4 2ir F eight Logistics 21 496 4 11 2 1lin s (50 5 ) -5 7 33 9port Services ( 08 -1 2 96 -40B ildin  P oducts 2 04 5Commercial Printi g 9 2 7 11 7nst uct on & Engineering 4 6                             1 5 8 0 Farm Machinery & Heavy Trucks 1 , 4 1. .D versified Commer ial & Professional Services 1 6 7El ctric l C mpo nts & Equipment 7 2 -nvi onm ntal & Fa lities Servic s 5 H avy El ctrical Equipm t 7 2ighw ys & R tracks (5 )    - 3a  R sou e & Employment Services ( 3                             -2 -6Industrial ngl merates 75Ma hin ry 7,87 .0 1 .Marine 9   0 40 4 2Ports  Se v ces 9 5 2 2Office Services  S ppli s ( 210 2 3 9Railr ads 1 2 1 0Tr di g C mp i s & Di tributors 2 8                             9 5 -ucki g 9 9 2 3 7% 7% 3 1%
Information Technology (470,913)                         -5.3% 118% -24.8%Application Software (39 388   9 2 0 5 6C municati ns Equipment 36 4 -24 0 97 32 1pu er Hard ar 1 6 54 1S rage & Peripherals (7 557 2 4 4 19 5Data Process ng & O tsourc d Services 2 870 5 3 -0 9Electron Equipment Manufacturers 7 1 8 7 3Ma uf ct ring Servic s 44                         13 1 3 3 4Ho e E t r i  Softwa e 5, 3   7.6 5 8.Interne  Sof w re & Services 1 7 6T Co sul ing & Oth r Servi es 29 0 2 - 7Offic l t o ics 2     Semi duc r Equipm nt (1 ) - 0 7t s 53 21 6ystems                          T ch l gy Dist ibutors 4 1   1 -
Materials (155,918)                         -2.6% 49% -8.0%Aluminum (16 572   4 7 117 -13 4Co modity Chemicals (9 687  3 0 50 7 8nstruction Materials 1 461 1 1 35 6 3Diversified Chemicals 22 44 6 1 5Met ls & Mining 203 3 9Fertil zers & Agricultural Chemicals 3 26 8 8 92 1st P oducts 75                          0 5 2G ld 3 , 5   5. .Indu rial Gas 39  2 1M al & Glas  Containers 0 8 ) -7 -5Paper P ck ging 8 3 8 2oducts (4 0r cio s Metal  & Minerals ( 1 0 6 0 7Sp ialty Chemicals 7                         te l (      
Utilities (138,646)                         -6.9% 59% -7.4%Independent Power Producers & Energy Traders
Telecommunications Services (162,206)                         -2.3% 117% -12.5%Alternative C rrier (53 29   -20 8 79 37 4In gr ed Telec mmunication Services ( 313  0 4 -5 6Wireless Tel com unication Services 06 664 5 1 3 9 9
Rate of Return 16,388                             0.1% 28% -0.5%
Utilities 16,388                             0.1% 28% -0.5%
Electric Utilities 24,091                             0.3% 35% -1.0%
Gas Utilities 5,851                               0.7% 6% 0.7%
Multi-Utilities (9,624)                              -0.3% 14% -0.4%
Water Utilities (3,930)                              -3.5% 7% -0.8%
Reg Capital Requirement (610,110)                         -2.0% 41% -0.5%
Financials (610,110)                         -2.0% 41% -0.5%
Diversified Banks 110,873                           1.9% 7% -0.4%
Life & Health Insurance (51,508)                            -1.7% 19% -3.9%
Multi-line Insurance (163,613)                         -6.9% 13% -1.8%
Property & Casualty Insurance 14,894                             0.5% 126% 1.8%
Regional Banks (18,308)                            -0.4% 11% -0.1%
Thrifts & Mortgage Finance (502,447)                         -4.1% 22% -1.5%
Specific Agency 335,338                           6.9% 67% -21.1%
Consumer Discretionary (32,476)                           -4.7% 31% -6.3%
Casinos & Gaming (32,476)                            -4.7% 31% -6.3%
Consumer Staples 125,464                           13.7% 86% 8.6%
Brewers 13,981                             6.7% 14% -1.1%
Distillers & Vintners 56                                     0.1% 19% -3.1%
Tobacco 111,427                           17.9% 145% 30.1%
Health Care 242,350                           7.4% 68% -30.3%
Biotechnology (31,687)                            -4.3% 79% -41.4%
Pharmaceuticals 274,037                           10.9% 47% -15.9%
Grand Total (1,899,583)                      -1.2% 84% -8.9%
Figure 3.4: Sum of Excess Returns vs. Average of Observations by Regulation Type
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3.8 Statistical Analysis
The difference between the observations of in the four different regulation types is apparent
visually and is perhaps best illustrated by the histogram below. The figure below shows a
histogram of the observations for each company and for each of the 10 years. Each regulation
type is shown in a separate histogram.
3.8.1 ANOVA Test
The four groups of observations appear quite different in the four histograms. To test
whether the difference is statistically significant, we compare the average of the observations
of the four regulation types. To test this, we use a ANOVA test where the null hypothesis
is that the average RI ratio is the same for all four regulation types.
The ANOVA test generally relies on each of the four samples having a normal distribu-
tion. Our samples are generally leptokurtic and left-skewed, but we are relying on the very
large number of observations — more than 50,000 — to offset the lack of normality in some
of the groups.
The ANOVA test compares the variability between the four groups to the variability
within the groups. The between-group variability is
MSbetween =
∑
i
ni(Y i − Y )2 (3.11)
where i is the regulation type, Y i is the average of the RI Ratios for a given regulation type,
and Y is the overall average of the RI ratios.
The within-group variability is
MSwithin =
∑
ij(Yij − Y i)2
(N −K) (3.12)
where N is the total number of observations and K the number of groups.
The F-test statistic is
F =
MSbetween
MSwithin
(3.13)
and follows and F distribution with 3 degrees of freedom.
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Figure 3.5: Histogram of Economic Profitability by Regulation Type
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Normal 
Regulatory 
Burden
Rate of 
Return
Reg Capital 
Requirement
Specific 
Agency
Average RIRatio -10.3% -0.5% -0.5% -21.1%
Count of RIRatio 52350 2672 9602 2710
Overall Average -8.1%
(ybar-y)2 0.0005 0.0057 0.0057 0.0168
(ybar-y)2 x n 25.2415 15.3465 55.1647 45.5343
sum[(ybar-y)2 x n] 141.2870
degrees of freedom 3
MSbetween 47.1
SSwithin 44272.4 204.0 1625.7 1211.1
degrees of freedom 52349 2671 9601 2709
MSwithin 0.7027
F-Statistic 67.02
Critical Value at 5% 2.605
P-Value 3.01E-43
Figure 3.6: Summary of ANOVA Analysis
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3.9 Conclusion
Most of empirical studies on the effects of regulation have looked at specific events within
one industry. In contrast, this study looks across 150 industries. These industries were cat-
egorized by the extent and type of regulation they face. The data show regulated industries
generate returns in excess of their cost of capital, while relatively less regulated companies
do not. The data also shows that regulated companies tend to have less variability in their
economic profits through the business cycle.
The evidence reveals a fascinating paradox: while most managers loathe regulation, the
profitability of regulated industries is higher than unregulated industries.
In the case of regulated utilities, the evidence shows that these companies generated
profits approximately equal to their cost of capital, unlike unregulated companies which
in aggregate do not. The regulated financial companies actually had returns that were, in
aggregate, slightly lower than less regulated companies, but two sub-industries — multi-line
insurance companies and thrifts and mortgage finance companies — were the only regulated
financial sub-industries where this was true. Regulated financial companies were also more
profitable than less regulated industries if the 2008–2009 period of financial turmoil is not
included in the database. Finally, the companies facing specific product regulation had
the highest returns in excess of their cost of capital. Participation in these sub-industries
did not guarantee excess returns — in fact, returns were more heterogeneous than in less
regulated industries — but in aggregate were greatly higher than less regulated industries
and the two other categories or regulated industries. The study further finds that difference
between the observation in the four categories is statistically significant, with a p-value in
ANOVA testing of approximately zero.
Appendix A
Economic Profitability by
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Operating Profit 
After Tax
Capital 
Deployed
Capital 
Charge
Residual 
Income
Industry RI 
Ratio
Std Dev of 
RIRatio
Normal Regulatory Burden 7,645,958                101,383,726     9.9% (1,549,590)    -1.5% 95%
Consumer Discretionary 605,172                   14,993,547        11.1% (823,640)       -5.5% 95%
Advertising 2,568                        219,815             11.7% (16,400)          -7.5% 77%
Apparel Retail 39,718                     300,808             10.7% 11,082           3.7% 55%
Apparel, Accessories & Luxury 
Goods 28,018                     263,902             11.5% (92)                 0.0% 41%
Auto Parts & Equipment 28,232                     619,174             11.5% (38,317)          -6.2% 196%
Automobile Manufacturers 79,504                     2,196,416          15.9% (157,454)        -7.2% 363%
Automotive Retail 18,154                     198,096             11.7% (3,044)            -1.5% 51%
Broadcasting & Cable TV 6,034                        3,369,004          13.0% (331,780)        -9.8% 100%
Catalog Retail (13)                            111,045             14.0% (9,664)            -8.7% 78%
Computer & Electronics Retail 14,871                     120,245             8.4% 4,333             3.6% 19%
Consumer Electronics 618                           21,426               10.2% (1,434)            -6.7% 63%
Department Stores 35,981                     634,509             10.0% (24,650)          -3.9% 48%
Distributors 8,073                        83,573               11.1% 496                 0.6% 47%
Education Services 9,219                        57,158               9.5% 5,332             9.3% 36%
Footwear 15,348                     96,937               8.5% 7,428             7.7% 22%
General Merchandise Stores 34,093                     316,240             8.2% 10,240           3.2% 18%
Home Furnishings 6,375                        139,597             11.6% (7,899)            -5.7% 93%
Home Improvement Retail 63,613                     406,047             9.8% 30,103           7.4% 41%
Homebuilding 25,024                     517,556             10.4% (25,967)          -5.0% 28%
Homefurnishing Retail 6,922                        55,406               10.9% 1,798             3.2% 43%
Hotels, Resorts & Cruise Lines 22,773                     373,969             10.4% (12,143)          -3.2% 31%
Household Appliances 11,796                     99,997               11.0% 2,305             2.3% 47%
Housewares & Specialties 9,356                        173,355             10.3% (5,413)            -3.1% 42%
Internet Retail (2,158)                      97,310               8.6% (10,610)          -10.9% 74%
Leisure Facilities 3,400                        107,244             11.1% (6,937)            -6.5% 18%
Leisure Products 8,958                        130,287             9.7% (3,000)            -2.3% 34%
Motorcycle Manufacturers 6,760                        35,924               10.2% 3,344             9.3% 14%
Movies & Entertainment (33,341)                    2,146,104          10.2% (211,576)        -9.9% 88%
Photographic Products 2,858                        45,603               10.4% (1,697)            -3.7% 19%
Publishing 60,138                     886,387             10.9% (16,025)          -1.8% 59%
Restaurants 68,608                     543,199             11.7% 25,561           4.7% 32%
Specialized Consumer Services 11,932                     160,233             8.9% (1,783)            -1.1% 26%
Specialty Stores 17,411                     368,564             11.8% (22,515)          -6.1% 49%
Textiles 898                           26,467               15.8% (1,974)            -7.5% 420%
Tires & Rubber (6,568)                      71,953               12.1% (15,290)          -21.2% 44%
Consumer Staples 651,577                   5,148,210          9.4% 287,231         5.6% 32%
Agricultural Products 20,031                     213,155             8.8% 2,731             1.3% 24%
Drug Retail 44,768                     381,044             9.0% 16,543           4.3% 39%
Food Distributors 11,604                     82,656               8.9% 5,433             6.6% 16%
Food Retail 62,671                     831,366             8.6% 1,972             0.2% 28%
Household Products 126,610                   766,802             7.8% 77,343           10.1% 20%
Hypermarkets & Super Centers 108,819                   767,914             7.3% 59,116           7.7% 8%
Packaged Foods & Meats 139,317                   1,312,443          8.8% 45,019           3.4% 33%
Personal Products 24,382                     136,449             13.2% 9,965             7.3% 39%
Soft Drinks 113,374                   656,381             8.3% 69,109           10.5% 27%
Figure A.1: Economic Profitability by Industry and Regulation Type, All Subindustries
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Operating Profit 
After Tax
Capital 
Deployed
Capital 
Charge
Residual 
Income
Industry RI 
Ratio
Std Dev of 
RIRatio
Energy 1,205,433                9,853,777          9.6% 410,944         4.2% 52%
Coal & Consumable Fuels 17,544                     197,749             11.0% (244)               -0.1% 77%
Integrated Oil & Gas 636,870                   3,517,621          8.3% 368,121         10.5% 10%
Oil & Gas Drilling 18,660                     217,196             9.6% (1,163)            -0.5% 29%
Oil & Gas Equipment & Services 61,622                     649,905             10.2% 2,601             0.4% 24%
Oil & Gas Exploration & 
Production 273,719                   2,816,819          9.6% 37,729           1.3% 58%
Oil & Gas Refining & Marketing 40,752                     399,168             9.6% 5,769             1.4% 64%
Oil & Gas Storage & 
Transportation 156,266                   2,055,319          8.5% (1,869)            -0.1% 58%
Financials 2,862,272                33,876,322        9.8% (632,535)       -1.9% 149%
Asset Management & Custody 
Banks 94,827                     1,212,737          9.9% (640)               -0.1% 47%
Consumer Finance 587,845                   9,065,058          10.2% (98,529)          -1.1% 147%
Diversified Capital Markets 19                             952                     12.6% (103)               -10.8% 36%
Diversified REIT's 30,447                     357,199             7.7% 3,549             1.0% 7%
Industrial REIT's 15,710                     228,500             8.3% (3,161)            -1.4% 11%
Insurance Brokers 22,492                     202,359             7.9% 8,737             4.3% 26%
Investment Banking & Brokerage 898,904                   6,678,209          15.4% (384,935)        -5.8% 435%
Mortgage REIT's 46,610                     813,675             12.4% (24,485)          -3.0% 38%
Multi-Sector Holdings 9,846                        108,447             8.4% (18)                 0.0% 28%
Office REIT's 55,873                     763,814             8.1% (5,716)            -0.7% 22%
Other Diversified Financial 
Services 790,925                   10,416,830        12.8% (128,800)        -1.2% 20%
Real Estate Investment Trusts -- 
Discontinued effective 
04/28/2006 3,147                        55,422               10.4% (1,360)            -2.5% 36%
Real Estate Management & 
Development 42,203                     621,308             8.3% (4,013)            -0.6% 39%
Real Estate Management & 
Development -- Discontinued 
effective 04/28/2006 754                           12,001               9.8% (345)               -2.9% 16%
Reinsurance 8,798                        82,630               8.4% 2,184             2.6% 8%
Residential REIT's 74,817                     582,548             7.2% 33,415           5.7% 34%
Retail REIT's 67,214                     912,503             8.1% (4,394)            -0.5% 5%
Specialized Finance 58,849                     984,983             9.3% (13,674)          -1.4% 78%
Specialized REIT's 52,991                     777,148             8.6% (10,247)          -1.3% 25%
Health Care 294,909                   3,299,844          8.8% 40,009           1.2% 60%
Health Care Distributors 24,517                     257,254             9.2% 7,952             3.1% 51%
Health Care Equipment 78,701                     809,138             8.1% 22,798           2.8% 38%
Health Care Facilities 33,222                     549,743             10.6% (21,893)          -4.0% 45%
Health Care Services 41,071                     458,132             9.4% 7,154             1.6% 100%
Health Care Supplies 5,631                        103,959             8.4% (2,161)            -2.1% 31%
Health Care Technology 3,508                        42,156               8.5% 330                 0.8% 79%
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Life Sciences Tools & Services 20,185                     352,188             8.5% (5,377)            -1.5% 48%
Managed Health Care 88,073                     727,274             8.5% 31,207           4.3% 25%
Industrial 1,049,300                11,862,614        10.1% 64,916           0.5% 62%
Aerospace & Defense 166,593                   1,572,716          10.0% 44,657           2.8% 42%
Air Freight & Logistics 61,566                     412,946             10.8% 21,841           5.3% 115%
Airlines 34,614                     813,816             10.4% (50,741)          -6.2% 34%
Airport Services (150)                          10,268               19.6% (1,238)            -12.1% 103%
Building Products 25,015                     283,477             10.9% (2,336)            -0.8% 35%
Commercial Printing 5,574                        155,042             11.6% (9,512)            -6.1% 102%
Construction & Engineering 15,157                     211,729             10.7% (4,315)            -2.0% 52%
Construction & Farm Machinery & 
Heavy Trucks 75,502                     716,527             10.5% 12,211           1.7% 31%
Diversified Commercial & 
Professional Services (664)                          10,776               10.5% (1,699)            -15.8% 44%
Electrical Components & 
Equipment 37,291                     374,127             9.9% 4,618             1.2% 131%
Environmental & Facilities 
Services 23,741                     389,479             9.4% (4,867)            -1.2% 60%
Heavy Electrical Equipment (489)                          5,837                  10.5% (1,062)            -18.2% 43%
Highways & Railtracks 73                             2,126                  6.2% (56)                 -2.6% 11%
Human Resource & Employment 
Services (903)                          4,529                  11.1% (1,355)            -29.9% 163%
Industrial Conglomerates 327,999                   3,364,800          9.2% 69,221           2.1% 18%
Industrial Machinery 70,861                     757,952             10.2% 7,248             1.0% 20%
Marine 3,404                        40,634               8.0% 188                 0.5% 42%
Marine Ports & Services 1,429                        17,337               7.5% 130                 0.7% 34%
Office Services & Supplies 47,888                     836,256             9.5% (18,291)          -2.2% 55%
Railroads 100,913                   1,098,164          8.0% 17,384           1.6% 12%
Trading Companies & Distributors 28,239                     294,213             10.6% 2,532             0.9% 23%
Trucking 25,647                     489,863             9.6% (19,641)          -4.0% 18%
Information Technology 193,011                   8,425,093          8.9% (467,221)       -5.5% 123%
Application Software (5,553)                      404,518             8.7% (37,234)          -9.2% 114%
Communications Equipment (234,632)                  1,402,300          8.9% (354,006)        -25.2% 101%
Computer Hardware 83,163                     710,486             8.9% 31,295           4.4% 55%
Computer Storage & Peripherals 15,500                     293,639             7.9% (7,090)            -2.4% 42%
Data Processing & Outsourced 
Services 82,079                     841,740             8.8% 20,457           2.4% 39%
Electronic Equipment 
Manufacturers 26,196                     413,740             9.0% (7,223)            -1.7% 184%
Electronic Manufacturing Services (8,707)                      225,790             9.4% (29,362)          -13.0% 33%
Home Entertainment Software (268)                          70,766               9.8% (5,443)            -7.7% 55%
Internet Software & Services (64,889)                    674,091             9.6% (117,414)        -17.4% 188%
IT Consulting & Other Services 102,303                   595,117             9.3% 62,278           10.5% 183%
Office Electronics 14,497                     171,048             9.8% (255)               -0.1% 35%
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Semiconductor Equipment 10,038                     295,897             9.0% (15,546)          -5.3% 41%
Semiconductors 42,527                     1,236,616          8.7% (58,917)          -4.8% 45%
Systems Software 129,027                   905,866             8.4% 65,345           7.2% 92%
Technology Distributors 1,730                        183,480             9.0% (14,107)          -7.7% 31%
Materials 360,888                   5,656,071          10.4% (147,507)       -2.6% 49%
Aluminum 17,328                     331,793             13.0% (15,919)          -4.8% 126%
Commodity Chemicals 20,041                     293,698             11.1% (7,829)            -2.7% 30%
Construction Materials 9,731                        120,934             10.8% (1,684)            -1.4% 37%
Diversified Chemicals 76,300                     699,200             10.7% 13,468           1.9% 16%
Diversified Metals & Mining 42,187                     492,823             11.2% (6,124)            -1.2% 45%
Fertilizers & Agricultural 
Chemicals 91                             248,027             9.3% (20,955)          -8.4% 95%
Forest Products 43,973                     471,090             9.7% 3,326             0.7% 23%
Gold 12,464                     604,044             8.4% (30,056)          -5.0% 39%
Industrial Gases 17,872                     154,668             7.7% 6,657             4.3% 11%
Metal & Glass Containers 6,858                        269,704             11.1% (19,574)          -7.3% 18%
Paper Packaging 17,565                     278,200             10.0% (7,619)            -2.7% 29%
Paper Products 27,429                     721,275             11.0% (41,184)          -5.7% 12%
Precious Metals & Minerals 1,221                        46,999               10.5% (3,091)            -6.6% 111%
Specialty Chemicals 27,119                     510,002             9.6% (17,318)          -3.4% 50%
Steel 40,707                     413,614             11.9% 396                 0.1% 55%
Utilities 39,426                     1,881,170          9.4% (136,552)       -7.3% 61%
Independent Power Producers & 
Energy Traders 39,426                     1,881,170          9.4% (136,552)        -7.3% 61%
Telecommunications Services 383,970                   6,387,078          11.0% (145,234)       -2.3% 125%
Alternative Carriers (22,784)                    197,529             12.0% (45,195)          -22.9% 82%
Integrated Telecommunication 
Services 333,042                   4,245,094          10.1% (7,648)            -0.2% 122%
Wireless Telecommunication 
Services 73,712                     1,944,455          11.9% (92,391)          -4.8% 147%
Rate of Return 757,501                   10,375,839        7.3% 21,404           0.2% 29%
Utilities 757,501                   10,375,839        7.3% 21,404           0.2% 29%
Electric Utilities 491,156                   6,594,941          7.2% 26,935           0.4% 37%
Gas Utilities 67,487                     811,498             7.7% 6,608             0.8% 6%
Multi-Utilities 195,616                   2,868,966          7.4% (8,523)            -0.3% 15%
Water Utilities 3,242                        100,434             7.1% (3,617)            -3.6% 7%
Reg Capital Requirement 1,655,568                29,180,808        5.5% (592,693)       -2.0% 43%
Financials 1,655,568                29,180,808        5.5% (592,693)       -2.0% 43%
Diversified Banks 435,548                   5,558,062          7.2% 102,261         1.8% 7%
Life & Health Insurance 229,560                   2,719,602          9.7% (41,181)          -1.5% 20%
Multi-line Insurance 63,721                     2,258,489          8.4% (160,814)        -7.1% 13%
Property & Casualty Insurance 234,518                   2,852,557          7.8% 20,772           0.7% 132%
Regional Banks 177,356                   4,267,091          5.1% (23,776)          -0.6% 12%
Thrifts & Mortgage Finance 514,865                   11,525,007        4.4% (489,955)        -4.3% 23%
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Specific Agency 633,496                   4,627,371          9.5% 310,702         6.7% 61%
Consumer Discretionary 31,244                     651,530             11.7% (30,474)          -4.7% 31%
Casinos & Gaming 31,244                     651,530             11.7% (30,474)          -4.7% 31%
Consumer Staples 174,594                   862,806             8.7% 114,468         13.3% 29%
Brewers 25,566                     197,361             7.0% 13,153           6.7% 14%
Distillers & Vintners 6,267                        80,434               8.6% (26)                 0.0% 19%
Tobacco 142,762                   585,011             10.4% 101,342         17.3% 43%
Health Care 427,659                   3,113,035          9.1% 226,708         7.3% 69%
Biotechnology 17,155                     715,610             9.4% (28,993)          -4.1% 81%
Pharmaceuticals 410,503                   2,397,425          8.7% 255,702         10.7% 46%
Grand Total 10,692,524              145,567,743     9.1% (1,810,178)    -1.2% 86%
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